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GUESTWORKERS:  A  TAXONOMY
Just over a century ago, a young Max Weber assumed his first professorship in Freiburg with a highly politicized inaugural lecture in which he invited the audience to follow him to the eastern marches of the Reich. There he described the Junkers’ 
turn to Polish seasonal labourers—people with ‘inferior physical and 
intellectual standards of living’ brought in to work the sugar-beet fields. 
These ‘troops of nomads recruited by agents in Russia, who cross the 
frontier in tens of thousands in spring and leave again in autumn’, 
appeared desirable, ‘because by employing them one can save on work-
ers’ dwellings, on poor rates, on social obligations, and further because 
their precarious situation as foreigners puts them in the hands of the 
landowners.’ Yet these ‘unviable colonies of starving Slavs’ were prop-
ping up an outmoded, labour-intensive system of production, and 
represented essentially a ‘side-effect of the death throes of the old 
Prussian Junkerdom’. The neophyte went on to rally the audience with 
the call that ‘the German race should be protected in the east of the 
country, and the state’s economic policies ought to rise to the challenge 
of defending it.’1
A century later, the brand of racial chauvinism to which Weber gave una-
bashed expression has gone out of vogue, but not the fundamental issues 
he raised: employer preferences for temporary migrant workers as a 
cheap and exploitable labour source, broker networks channelling them 
across borders, fears of such workers shoring up outdated industries or 
inhibiting economic modernization, and—perhaps especially—worries 
about foreigners degrading the nation. After the Second World War, 
Germans would no longer speak of ‘troops of nomads’ but ‘guestworkers’, 
a refurbished version of the Nazi euphemism for Fremdarbeiter. But the 
phenomenon is much broader. Today, over fifty countries run temporary 
migrant-worker programmes: state-organized schemes for the import 
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of foreign labourers, admitted on a temporary basis for the purpose 
of work, and granted limited or no option for changing this status. Yet 
the ubiquity of such schemes has provoked little comparative analysis. 
Investigations of individual programmes are plentiful, with small—
two- to three-n—case studies common; but their evolution across the 
twentieth century and the globe has yet to be examined.2
Five questions can guide an initial exploration of this terrain. First, what 
has been the place of guestworkers within the global flows of migrant 
labour since the late nineteenth century? Second, in what does the speci-
ficity of guestworker programmes lie? Third, what are the contradictions 
that—as with so much of social life—can be regarded as inherent to 
them? What kind of typology can we use to understand them? Where 
are they headed?
Migrants or guestworkers?
In 2010 the United Nations counted some 214 million international 
migrants in the world, of whom about half were migrant workers. Of 
the latter, nearly 20 million were guestworkers—slightly more than 
the number of refugees, according to un estimates.3 Though not an 
1 Max Weber, ‘The Nation State and Economic Policy’, in Weber, Political Writings, 
Cambridge 1994, pp. 1–28. Translation modified.
2 Two exceptions to the small-n rule are Cindy Hahamovitch, ‘Creating Perfect 
Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World in Historical Perspective’, Labour History, 
vol. 44, no. 1, 2003, which provides a broad historical overview but shies away from 
analytic conclusions, and Martin Ruhs, The Price of Rights: Regulating International 
Labour Migration, Princeton 2013, which tests hypotheses about the relationship 
between migrants’ rights and the parameters of labour-migration programmes, 
broadly defined, but limits its analysis to the present. 
3 Manolo Abella, ‘Policies and Best Practices for Management of Temporary 
Migration’: Paper presented at the International Symposium on International 
Migration and Development, un Secretariat, Italy 2006, pp. 4–6. This offers details 
on the substantial definitional and measurement difficulties of pinning down the 
number of guestworkers globally. An approximate estimate based on figures col-
lected by the Migration News centre at the University of California, Davis, yields the 
figure given here. In 2008, the oecd claimed 2.3 million temporary foreign work-
ers, to which can be added 1.6 million in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The 
nascent temporary migrant-worker programmes elsewhere in Southeast Asia—
largely government attempts to regulate flows already in place—have tagged about 
a million guestworkers apiece in Thailand and Indonesia. Tipping the scale, the 
Gulf States count approximately 13 million guestworkers. 
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inconsiderable proportion, 20 per cent is still clearly a minority. It seems 
logical therefore to assume that guestworker programmes form a rather 
specialized, perhaps even in some measure atypical, sub-set within the 
wider phenomenon of worldwide labour migration. 
However, the statistical distribution between guestworker schemes 
and migrant labour conceals their structural relationship, which is the 
inverse. What typically makes immigrants economically desirable to 
employers—their submissive malleability as rightless outsiders who 
perform the undignified tasks that natives shun—are precisely the quali-
ties that make them undesirable as members of a society.4 If we take 
this paradox as a baseline for exploring patterns of migration, from the 
crystallization of the modern nation-state in the late nineteenth century 
onwards, a deduction would be that guestworker programmes of one 
kind or another are, virtually by definition, its ideal-typical resolution: 
they are designed to achieve the first (malleable labour) without incur-
ring the second (unwanted members). Viewed in this light, they could be 
seen less as a sub-set of immigration more broadly considered, than as 
the rule from which departures are to be explained. Namely, at points in 
their economic development, nation-states, as caretakers of capital and 
the demos, will typically call up migrants as extraneous labour, but seek 
to repel them as durable intruders. 
Departures from this standard can then be classified into three kinds 
of exception. The first are settler societies, where land is so abundant 
and labour so scarce that immigration is a condition of constructing the 
nation-state as such. The pre-eminent cases are the United States and 
the ‘White Dominions’ of the British Empire, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, where native populations were wiped out or suppressed 
in the course of Western overseas expansion. The second are countries 
where overall demographic deficiencies threaten absolute labour short-
ages and/or military weakness in a competitive strategic environment. 
Again, members are needed and return not enforced. The France of the 
Third Republic, haunted by military defeat and a precocious onset of 
4 Aristide Zolberg drew attention to this paradox in his extensive historical research 
into the role of the state in regulating cross-border flows. See Zolberg, ‘Global 
Movements, Global Walls: Responses to Migration, 1885–1925’, in Wang Gungwu, 
ed., Global History and Migrations, Boulder 1996, p. 294. Much broader welcome 
mats are, of course, typically unrolled for immigrants taking up highly skilled jobs, 
including greater rights and paths to permanent residence or citizenship.
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the demographic transition, sought to overcome its numerical inferior-
ity to Germany by welcoming immigrants to man its heavy industries. 
Colonial empires formed a third type of exception: migrants might 
enter the metropole with substantial rights, as fellow-nationals or over-
seas subjects of the Crown, under no compulsion to return; post-war 
colonial migration to Britain, France and the Netherlands, or pre-war 
Korean migration to Japan, are cases in point. Of course, guestworker 
programmes have existed in all three of these exceptions to the rule, but 
their significance has been far less. 
Enter the state
If guestworkers are foreign labourers without a guarantee of permanent 
settlement in the country making use of them, they are, nonetheless, a 
specific kind of temporary migrant. This is evident if we look back at a 
typical pattern of their use in much of the nineteenth century. Exposed 
so vividly by Marx, the spread of capitalist production in his time—and 
after it—relied on pools of workers on the margins of metropolitan 
economies, ‘reserve armies of labour’, to ensure the flexibility of produc-
tion costs, holding down wages in upswings of the business cycle and 
cutting payrolls in downturns.5 In Victorian England, it was the Irish 
who supplied such a reserve. But in still peripheral zones of an expand-
ing world market, especially where plantation economies were installed, 
migrants often had to be imported from much greater distances to fill 
the fields and supply the necessary pools. 
This demand gave birth to the so-called coolie trade, which took hold 
in the wake of slavery’s abolition. Here, private capital organized the 
labour flows, with public authorities playing, at most, a light regulatory 
role. Networks of trading companies and labour-brokers filled ships with 
human cargo in Guangzhou, Madras and Calcutta, departing for the West 
Indies, North America, Southeast Asia, and British-held Africa. Imperial 
reliance on indentured labour in the mining and plantation industries 
of Southeast Asia would stretch into the early twentieth century, man-
aged by brokers and employers who would simply renew contracts if 
debts had not been paid off. States, in this period, had not yet elaborated 
an infrastructure for oversight, and formal immigration regimes were 
minimal. Illegality—later to become a central issue in policy-making—
had little meaning.
5 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Chapter 25.
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This relatively open system, driven by the dynamics of primitive accu-
mulation in the periphery, would begin to change around the close of 
the nineteenth century. Economic downturns in plantation production, 
coupled with gradual restrictions on indentured labour, led to a decline 
of the coolie trade, while metropolitan societies started to enforce greater 
control over their own borders. Temporary migrant labour would still 
be needed, but—in a decisive shift—it was to be organized and super-
intended by the state. Laissez-faire gave way to regulation. Though a 
constant of capitalism, employer demands for exploitable sources of 
labour alone do not make for guestworkers. It is the state that creates 
them, at once sanctioning their traversal of its borders and ensuring the 
transience of their stay. 
Government protection of both the economy and the nation are the dual 
drivers behind modern guestworker schemes. The state can superintend 
an inflow of cheap and flexible workers required by capital, but rarely 
can it afford to treat the people in whose name it rules in the same way. 
Foreigners are more easily reduced to mere labour power. To maximize 
economic utility while minimizing social cost, their entrance can be 
controlled, exit monitored and employment options restricted. These 
become possible functions of the state once a bureaucratic apparatus 
with the capacity for enforcing an immigration regime is in place; and 
pressing functions, once workers become voters, trade unions impinge 
on labour markets and the provision of public welfare begins.
The German case is emblematic of this development. Economic growth 
transformed the mass exits from Germany to North America of the mid-
1800s into mass in-migration, supplemented by labour imports, largely 
from Polish areas, by the end of the century. In 1886 Bismarck’s anti-
Polish campaigns briefly closed the eastern border, but Junker pressure 
soon reopened doors under an informal agreement that workers should 
return home during winter. Limits were placed on the areas and indus-
tries in which foreigners could labour, but oversight and enforcement 
initially lay in the hands of employers rather than the government; the 
state remained on the sidelines, as economic forces channelled the flows. 
Brokers with networks stretching deep into Russia recruited workers, 
while employer associations—not the German or Prussian state—
issued ‘worker legitimation cards’ and extracted fees from migrants to 
manage their seasonal return. By 1913, about 300,000 Poles burrowed 
in Ruhrgebiet mines, and nearly one million foreign workers toiled in 
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Prussia. Sugar-beet production was so dependent on Weber’s ‘colonies 
of starving Slavs’ (they carried out nearly two-thirds of Prussian agricul-
tural work) that despite xenophobic concerns, Berlin was reluctant to 
regulate them for fear of harming the industry.6
This did not last for long. The First World War reshaped these massive 
transfers as the state tightened its grip over cross-border mobility. The 
Weimar Republic continued the passport and visa regime put in place 
during the War, established official recruitment bureaux in sending 
countries and set up government agencies to regulate the labour market. 
Union grievances were met by state quotas on the number of foreigners 
allowed to work in specific industries, with visas offered only if a labour 
shortage was confirmed. By the time of the Great Depression, employers 
had to apply for permission to hire foreign workers, who encountered 
great difficulties in obtaining visas after five years and were subject to 
penalties for overstaying. Such was the shape of a transition general to 
the economies of the West in this period. Guestworkers are born when it 
is no longer sufficient to speak of Arbeitgeber and Arbeitnehmer, and the 
Arbeitsvermittler that connect them, but when an additional party—the 
Arbeitsausrichter, or the state—supervenes to direct the flows and safe-
guard the boundary between nationals and foreigners. 
Contradictions
What are the characteristic dynamics between the parties that constitute 
guestworker regimes? For employers, guestworkers supply a convenient 
reservoir of labour that can easily be dispensed with and which offers 
the advantage of depressing wages. Migrant labourers are typically target-
earners, hoping to pocket more than they would in the poorer regions 
they come from, in order to obtain defined, but not unchanging, goals 
back home: a house, a plot of land, a small business, schooling for their 
children. The middlemen who connect the two skim off profits from the 
labour trade. The calculus of interests is more complex for the state, which 
6 Inter alia: Knuth Dohse, Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat: Genese und 
Funktion von staatlicher Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht, Königstein 1981, pp. 
32–4; Imre Ferenczi, Arbeitslosigkeit und die internationalen Arbeiterwanderungen, 
Jena 1913, pp. 72–4; Klaus Bade, ‘Labour, Migration and the State: Germany 
from the Late 19th Century to the Onset of the Great Depression’, in Bade, ed., 
Population, Labour and Migration in 19th and 20th-Century Germany, Hamburg 
1987, pp. 59–86. 
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stands as the political guardian of capital, with a vital stake in economic 
development, and as the embodiment of national legitimacy to the popu-
lace in whose name it rules. Voters and employers may both want growth, 
but citizens want security—material and psychological—as well. Stable 
jobs, social benefits and traditional identities matter to them as they do 
not to capital. The state cannot afford to ignore these, and office-holders 
may, indeed, actively whip up anxieties over them. While employers 
prefer the logic of the business cycle or other economic temporalities to 
determine flows, with little turnover of the labour force otherwise, the 
state may have an interest in preventing the passage of time and accul-
turation from wearing away the boundary between its native population 
and ‘others’, who may contribute to, but should not unduly benefit from, 
‘our’ collective goods, let alone sully the purity of the nation.
Tensions between these temporal logics, partially aligned but never wholly 
coincident, nearly always surface as guestworker programmes run their 
course. They are over-determined in turn by a third, more fundamen-
tal contradiction—a forward-propulsion of migration flows themselves. 
The middlemen channelling workers across borders do so most often for 
a profit, extracted from employers at the onset of flows when demand 
exceeds supply, and subsequently from migrants as paths become well-
worn and supply exceeds demand. Migrants paying off their debts will 
seek to extend their employment until some savings may be pocketed, 
while the impact of chain migration and remittances back home can 
raise the earning targets they aim for. The result of these tensions, in the 
absence of state supervision, can be seen in the coolie trade. Most coolies 
carried contracts for five years of work plus a return voyage. But the pas-
sage home was in many cases foregone. Of the Chinese recruited to build 
us railroads, harvest cotton and dig mines, only half returned—a rate 
comparable to that of many European immigrants to America. About 90 
per cent of Indian labourers sent to the Caribbean remained.7
Typology of forms
The three-way dynamics, and the contradictions to which they give rise, 
are formal properties of any guestworker regime as an abstract struc-
ture. But what of its concrete variations? In surveying the programmes 
that have taken hold in different regions of the world, five major forms 
7 Zolberg, ‘Global Movements, Global Walls’, pp. 288, 291. 
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can be discerned, based on the location and scale of guestwork within 
the labour market. 
1. Core-Industrial. The first is representative of what is both the earli-
est and longest-lasting of all guestworker programmes, which for over a 
century has provided the bulk of the labour force in South Africa’s key 
industrial sector. In the gold mines of the Rand, discovered in 1886, 
cheap, disposable labour transformed what were—by Canadian or 
Australian standards—low-quality and hard-to-reach deposits into the 
cornerstone of the South African economy. In 1897, the Boer government 
of the Transvaal signed an agreement with Portugal for the Chamber 
of Mines to import labour from Mozambique to man the shafts on a 
rotational basis, without permanent population loss from the sending 
regions. To alleviate the fierce competition for workers, the mines were 
given power by treaty to establish a hiring agency and a web of recruiting 
stations and transport lines, including more than 1,500 miles of roads, 
which left little of the rural hinterland untouched. After Britain seized 
the Transvaal, the colonial government continued the agreement and 
negotiated successive modifications. Following independence, Pretoria 
was eager to continue the system of labour import treaties, which would 
make neighbouring states—Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho, as well as 
Mozambique—economically dependent on the earnings sent home 
from those toiling underground. With techniques borrowed from con-
vict labour regimes, migrant workers were locked in closed compounds 
for the duration of their stay, usually a year or two, with compulsory 
remittances, and atrocious working conditions.8 
More striking is the continuity of the system since the end of apartheid, 
even as the sector declines in importance. Industrial restructuring in the 
1990s actually brought heightened dependence on guestworkers. The 
force that might have secured an end to the system, the National Union 
of Mineworkers, a close ally of the African National Congress when it 
took power, has merely called for its reform. The Chamber of Mines, for 
its part, has had no difficulty persuading the government that the South 
African economy is too exposed and reliant on mining to permit any 
8 Jonathan Crush, ‘Migrations Past: An Historical Overview of Cross-Border 
Movement in Southern Africa’, in David McDonald, ed., On Borders: Perspectives on 
International Migration in Southern Africa, New York 2000, pp. 14–15; R. Mansell 
Prothero, ‘Foreign migrant labour for South Africa’, International Migration Review, 
vol. 8, no. 3, 1974, pp. 384–5. 
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tampering with the status quo.9 Competition between sending states, 
meanwhile, undercuts attempts to improve the conditions of their nation-
als abroad, as each tries to close secret deals to secure larger quotas—and 
remittances—rather than greater security for its citizens. With three 
South Africans laid off for every foreign miner, guestworkers still con-
stitute over half of the labour force in the mines, at a time when youth 
unemployment in South Africa runs close to 40 per cent. The unique 
continuity of this core-industrial variant of the guestworker phenomenon 
has not tempered its savagely exploitative character, as the 2012 massacre 
of strikers in the platinum mine of Marikana reminds us. 
2. Regional-Supplemental. A second model involves guestworkers con-
centrated in a regional sub-section of the labour force. This is also 
occupationally selective, but overall economic dependence is less. Poles 
moving into Prussian agriculture under the Kaiserreich were a forerun-
ner. During the Second World War, the us pushed the form further: 
military mobilization and stepped-up industrial production saw western 
agriculturalists calling for seasonal workers to address labour shortages 
in their ‘factories in the fields’. The us government pressed a reluctant 
Mexico into a bilateral agreement for the import of guestworkers by 
waiving grievances over the nationalization of American oil companies. 
The Mexican state presented the programme to its citizens as a step 
towards modernization of the country, with participants acquiring new 
farm techniques and equipment in the service of la familia mexicana. 
In this case, the us government—not, as in Junker Prussia, the local 
landowners—became the formal employer and guarantor of the rights 
of the temporary immigrants under the Bracero Agreement of 1942.10 
Though set to expire within five years, the programme proved popular 
among employers in California and Texas, who by 1947 had recruited 
more than 800,000 hands on seasonal contracts which excluded the 
option of naturalization. The Korean War spurred renewal of the pro-
gramme, which would induct around two million braceros before it 
finally expired in 1964, on the eve of a general immigration reform. In 
its place came an expanded h–2 permit system—under the control of 
9 On the post-apartheid situation, see Jonathan Crush and Clarence Tshitereke, 
‘Contesting Migrancy: The Foreign Labour Debate in Post-1994 South Africa’, 
Africa Today, vol. 48, no. 3, 2001, pp. 49–70. 
10 Deborah Cohen, ‘Caught in the Middle: The Mexican State’s Relationship with 
the United States and Its Own Citizen-Workers, 1942–1954’, Journal of American 
Ethnic History, Spring 2001, pp. 111–5.
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the Immigration and Naturalization Service rather than the Department 
of Labour—to recruit low-skilled workers on temporary contracts.11
Symptomatically for guestworker schemes, the principal legacy of the 
Bracero Programme came to lie outside it, in the development of mass 
irregular migration across the Rio Grande. Associated employer’s fees 
for hiring through the programme ensured that Mexicans entering with-
out papers remained the cheapest form of labour.12 Though the number 
of people slipping past formal controls is notoriously difficult to esti-
mate, in 1948 around 70,000 Mexicans were illegally working in the 
us, and by 1952 the figure had risen to 1.5 million. At the close of the 
decade more than 3.6 million irregular migrants from Mexico had been 
arrested—over double the numbers in the 1940s.13
Such unintended consequences have not dulled the appetite for tem-
porary foreign labour in Washington, where expanded guestworker 
schemes form a key component of the immigration reforms now under 
discussion. The Senate has already approved a package that would com-
bine a ‘border surge’, doubling electronic barriers and agents to keep out 
the unwanted, with entry for larger numbers of temporary workers. The 
annual intake of highly skilled guestworkers would increase to 110,000; 
more controversially, farm workers could double to 120,000—the final 
figure to be determined by a market-research bureau funded by guest-
worker fees. House Republicans have opted for a more piecemeal but 
capacious approach, with a series of separate bills that would grant 
entrance to up to half a million guestworkers. Each would be obliged 
to spend two months a year back home, with wages docked to ensure 
they do so: 10 per cent of their total earnings would be paid only upon 
final exit. Whether either version will actually materialize, given current 
Congressional deadlock, is another question.
11 Kitty Cavalita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration and the ins, 
New York 1992, provides the most detailed examination of the scheme’s rise 
and decline.
12 The us government sought to deal with irregular entrants by ‘drying out the 
wetbacks’—workers found without papers were taken across the border and given 
official documents—an extra trip that soon most braceros were making. In 1949, 
20,000 guestworkers entered through formal channels, and 87,000 wetbacks 
had their status regularized after entry: Philip Martin, Promise Unfulfilled: Unions, 
Immigration and the Farm Workers, Ithaca 2003, p. 47.
13 Philip Martin and Michael Teitelbaum, ‘The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers’, 
Foreign Affairs, November–December 2001, p. 122. 
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3. National-Supplemental. Distinct from this pattern, and outstripping it 
in economic importance, is the national-supplemental variant of guest-
worker programmes elaborated in the Old World, where labour shortages 
ran deep after the war. Countries with substantial colonies, including the 
uk, France and the Netherlands, had little need to search elsewhere for 
labour. (France’s small guestworker programme set up under the Office 
National de l’Immigration was largely ineffective; Britain’s miniature 
programme expired after five years.) The subjects of their overseas pos-
sessions could enter the labour market with some rights as nationals, 
though these doors were gradually closed from the 1960s on, with vol-
untary repatriation schemes introduced by the 1970s. 
Without colonial hinterlands, it was the German-speaking countries that 
resorted to large-scale guestworker programmes in a strict sense. Though 
Switzerland and Austria had their own variants, the Federal Republic set 
the pace.14 A series of bilateral agreements across the 1950s and 60s 
secured workers from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and above all Turkey. In 
many cases, states struggling with high unemployment joined forces with 
German employers in organizing and promoting these programmes, 
while within the Federal Republic a fully developed state bureaucracy, 
with offices in the sending states, mediated between employers and 
workers. By the turn of the 1970s, 2.5 million foreigners were toiling in 
West Germany, present across manufacturing and services. This was a 
guestworker system on a nationwide scale. Where in the us, the Bracero 
Programme at its height never amounted to more than 0.6 per cent of 
the labour force, in West Germany Gastarbeiter, at a peak of 11 per cent, 
were nearly twenty times more numerous in relative terms.
At the beginning, the ‘rotation principle’ by which workers were offered 
contracts of one or two years, as in South Africa, was no dead letter. 
About 75 per cent of a total of nearly 19 million arrivals in the Federal 
Republic returned to their homelands.15 But a policy that allowed firms to 
request workers by name encouraged longer-term employment, and by 
the turn of the 1970s, the rotation system had broken down: more than 
half of all guestworkers had been in the country for more than six years. 
14 For the development of guestworker programmes in Switzerland, see Hans-
Joachim Hoffman-Nowotny, Das Fremde in der Schweiz: Ergebnisse soziologischer 
Forschung, Zurich 2001.
15 Elmar Hönekopp, ‘Labour Migration to Germany from Central and Eastern 
Europe: Old and New Trends’, iab Labour Market Research Topics 23, 1997, p. 1.
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The end of recruitment with the 1973 oil shock saw the encouragement, 
but not enforcement of return. For meanwhile, converging pressures 
had increased the rights of migrants: courts limited deportations; pro-
tests by unions, churches and charities relaxed restrictions on family 
reunion; Kindergeld was extended to newcomers. The upshot was the 
opposite of the policymakers’ intention: while the size of the migrant 
labour force shrank, the size of the immigrant population grew. How far 
this outcome is from any social consensus can be seen from the rever-
berations of Thilo Sarrazin’s fear—the anxiety of a social-democrat—that 
Germany thereby risks ‘undoing itself’. Weber would have shared it. 
Switzerland, with guestworker flows of similar magnitude, is also no 
poster child for integration.
4. Primary. The 1973 oil shock that brought guestworker programmes 
in Europe to a halt was the impetus for their spectacular takeoff in the 
Middle East, where the oil revenues of the Gulf States—Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman—tripled 
within five years. There, for the first time in history, guestworkers would 
become not a complementary, but the primary labour force in the local 
economies. Before the oil shock, an estimated one million foreign work-
ers could be found in the gcc states; within two years, the figure had 
trebled. While nationals planted themselves in public administration 
and state agencies, aliens assumed almost the entirety of private-sector 
employment. Saudi Arabia’s size—at almost 30 million, its population is 
nearly twice that of the other gcc states combined—is such that guest-
workers account for ‘merely’ half of its total labour force, though 80 per 
cent of private-sector employment. In the smaller Gulf States, depend-
ence on guestworkers reaches dizzying heights. In Oman and Bahrain, 
they supply about 75 per cent of the labour force and 80 per cent of 
private-sector employment. In Kuwait, the uae and Qatar, the figures 
rise to 85–95 per cent of the labour force and nearly 100 per cent of all 
private-sector employment.16 
Though the free movement of labour in the region was discussed in 
the 60s, tremendous economic growth brought a hardening of national 
16 Making skilful use of the limited data available, Martin Baldwin-Edwards has pro-
duced the clearest statistical picture of labour migration in the gcc states: ‘Labour 
Immigration and Labour Markets in the gcc Countries: National Patterns and 
Trends’, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in 
the Gulf States, London School of Economics, March 2011.
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borders. Visa-waivers and naturalization options for fellow-Arabs were 
cancelled by the mid-70s. While states like Germany and Switzerland 
had turned to close neighbours for guestworkers as a safeguard of 
their return, fear of pan-Arab calls for the sharing of oil wealth and 
overthrow of monarchies encouraged gcc countries in the opposite 
direction, substituting once strong patterns of informally organized 
intra-Arab migration with massive flows of migrant labour from South 
and Southeast Asia, a transfer that accelerated with the 1991 Gulf War.17 
The shift in recruitment was accompanied by a change in organiza-
tion. Whereas trans-border labour flows had once been run by oil 
companies and labour brokers, now states developed their own man-
agement of them, in the form of a sponsorship or Kefala system. To 
enter a gcc state, migrants must be sponsored by an employer, whose 
name is recorded in their visa as the only person for whom they can 
legally work, and who assumes legal and financial responsibility for the 
worker. Visas usually last for two years and are renewable, yet naturali-
zation is forbidden. The strict limits on employment under the Kefala 
system, however, have multiplied the number of illegal immigrants, 
since anyone who does not work for the employer specified on his or 
her visa is in violation of the law. Already by the early 1990s, about 15 
per cent of the foreign workforce across the region was illegal. Today an 
estimated 30 per cent of the uae guestworkers carry documents nam-
ing fictitious companies, and 70 per cent of visas for Saudi Arabia are 
traded on the black market.18
The Kefala system has thus not only failed to ensure rotational migra-
tion, but renders migrants peculiarly vulnerable to abuse, since any 
complaint can lead to swift dismissal and a seat on a plane home. The 
elaborate recruitment industry that has grown up around the system has 
transformed excess demand into excess supply, and working conditions 
have worsened correspondingly. The transportation, passport and medi-
cal costs once covered by the sponsor have been devolved to agents, who 
quickly pass them on to migrant workers. Across the 80s and 90s, mass 
influx led to a fall in wages and a rise in recruitment fees and debt bonds, 
which migrants must work ever longer to pay off. Yet the profitability to 
employers and middlemen of a status quo where legality and illegality 
17 Andrzej Kapiszewski, ‘Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the gcc Countries’, 
un Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the 
Arab Region, May 2006.
18 Baldwin-Edwards, ‘Labour Immigration in the gcc Countries’, pp. 40–1. 
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blend into each other is often a stronger force than government controls: 
mass deportations are not enforced. Meanwhile native unemployment is 
on the rise, particularly among youth, with estimates as high as 35 per 
cent for Saudi Arabia. The public sector, known for over-staffing and 
low productivity, is saturated, yet the education system continues to pro-
duce nationals geared for such jobs. Weak efforts to respond to social 
concerns by replacing foreign with native workers have met with little 
success, as most natives still aim for comfortable jobs in the administra-
tive apparatus of regimes that are parasitic to a degree never witnessed 
before on guestworker labour.
5. Marginal. Finally, there is one major region of the world market where 
the diametrically opposite pattern holds. There guestworkers have until 
now remained structurally marginal as a proportion of the workforce. 
In this region, the swift transition from agrarian to fully developed 
industrial societies has been followed by some of the lowest birth rates 
in the world, posing the obvious demographic challenge: how is eco-
nomic dynamism to be maintained with a steadily ageing population 
and shrinking workforce? Left to itself, the logic of capital would point 
to the import of foreign labour to make good the domestic shortfall. 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have, to a remarkable degree, resisted 
this. High fertility and mass rural-to-urban migration provided suf-
ficient labour to rebuild their economies after the Second World War, 
most rapidly in Japan. But when Japanese employers in the early 70s 
proposed admitting foreign workers to keep production costs down, they 
met harsh union and media criticism, and were quickly silenced by the 
government, which took other steps to promote growth. These included 
mechanization, overseas production, mobilization of youth and women 
workers and wage increases—hallmarks of what would later be dubbed 
the ‘developmental state’. Their success reinforced a strong consensus 
that growth was possible without opening doors.19 
Yet by the late 80s, buoyant economies outgrew the status quo, and Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan saw the numbers of illegal workers growing, 
alongside employer demands for low-cost foreigners. Wary of incurring 
the well-known unintended consequences of de jure guestworkers, Japan 
19 Kajita Takamichi, ‘Nihon no Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Seisaku’, in Kajita Takamichi 
and Miyajima Takashi, eds, Kokusaikasuru Nihonshakai, Tokyo 2002, pp. 15–44; 
David Chiavacci, Japans neue Immigrationspolitik: Ostasiatisches Umfeld, ideelle 
Diversität und institutionelle Fragmentierung, Wiesbaden 2011. 
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and Korea instituted small de facto versions in the form of ‘intern’ and 
‘trainee’ programmes, enabling around 100,000 to 200,000 workers 
from China and Southeast Asia to labour for up to three years, for less 
than the minimum wage, under the guise of ‘skill transfer’. Brokers 
implement the scheme under a layer of bureaucracy, with typically 
exploitative results. Japan’s programme has been criticized by the us 
and un for implementing forced labour akin to slavery.20 In Korea such 
abuses have faced sharper criticism. Concerted civil-society pressure over 
extensive rights violations obliged the Korean government in the early 
2000s to shift to a formal guestworker scheme, aimed at undercutting 
the role of brokers and checking the multiplication of illegal workers, 
who by this time outnumbered trainees. The new programme allows 
270,000 guestworkers into the country for up to five years, in designated 
occupations. Upward expansion in both societies is hindered by parallel 
employment systems for co-ethnics—typically Japanese-Brazilians and 
Korean-Chinese—who work in semi-skilled jobs, and roughly match the 
guestworkers in numbers, though not in rights. Unlike other foreign-
ers, they have greater labour-market freedom and can either renew their 
visas indefinitely or apply for permanent residence. But this is a drop in 
the bucket for a country like Korea with a labour force of 25 million, not 
to speak of Japan with a labour force of 65 million.
Taiwan set up a formal guestworker scheme much earlier, starting in 
the 1990s, to funnel foreign workers into manufacturing and construc-
tion jobs. The programme was intended as a temporary measure until 
technology could substitute for labour in these fields, but it was soon 
expanded into other sectors, of which carework has become the fastest-
growing. A close eye is kept on the national labour market in managing 
the programme, which currently has about 475,000 participants. The 
government allocates a limited number of quotas to employers in sec-
tors deemed in need of foreign labour; competition for these is fierce, 
as it also is for the licensed broker agencies that handle the matching of 
workers to jobs. The threat of losing a much sought-after slot for hiring 
a foreigner, and the substantial deposit paid to the government for each 
migrant—returned only when an airline company has verified he or 
she is back in the country of origin—keeps employers on guard against 
20 See, for example, Jorge Bustamante, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants’, United Nations Human Rights Council, Seventeenth 
Session, 2011, p. 10.
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‘runaways’, holding the number of irregular workers down to an esti-
mated mere 20,000.21 But if the problem of a growing illegal population 
has been avoided, that of rotation has not. These ‘temporary workers for 
permanent jobs’ have seen their length of stay repeatedly extended, and 
discussions are now underway about increasing the current nine-year 
limit to twelve. 
In sum, despite long life expectancies and rock-bottom birth rates 
(Taiwan and Korea typically compete for last place in the world), the 
contribution of guestworkers to the total labour force is minimal—4 
per cent or less—in all of these countries. Though marriage migration 
is increasingly encouraged, in none of them is the settlement of low-
skilled workers or their transformation into consumers on the agenda. 
Outsourcing jobs in manufacturing to cheap-wage locations in China 
or Southeast Asia, in which Japanese companies historically took the 
lead, has been one response to diminishing supplies of labour at home. 
Robotization, in which again Japan has been in the global vanguard, is 
another. But neither construction nor services lend themselves readily 
to such solutions. The reluctance of East Asian states to institute guest-
worker programmes of any size suggests a limit to the structural analysis 
I outlined earlier.
Social determinants
What is this limit? The dynamics of the relationships between employ-
ers, states, migrants and their brokers can illuminate much in the 
outcomes, intended and unintended, of guestworker programmes 
around the world. But the range of variations in their scale is explica-
ble by reference to what is missing from this trio—namely, the social 
structures in which they have arisen. This is brought home by the East 
Asian anomaly, whose lesson is that what we need is not simply a typo-
logy of guestworker programmes, but a taxonomy of the forms of social 
organization in which they have taken shape. Corresponding respec-
tively to core-industrial, regional-supplemental, national-supplemental, 
primary and marginal programmes are what can be termed colonial, 
settler, autochthonous, rentier and isolate historical settings. Colonial 
21 Yen-fen Tseng and Hong-zen Wang, ‘Governing Migrant Workers at a Distance: 
Managing the Temporary Status of Guestworkers in Taiwan’, International Migration, 
vol. 51, no. 4, 2011, pp. 1–19.
100 nlr 84
South Africa, settler North America, rentier Persian Gulf, as fundamen-
tally different orders are relatively self-descriptive. What of the other two 
forms? ‘Autochthonous’ describes for the most part long-inhabited and 
densely populated areas, and ‘isolate’ the same, but with significantly 
more limited interactions with their neighbours—the contrast, essen-
tially, between Western Europe and East Asia.
It is within the context of these different forms of social organization that 
the role and character of guestworker programmes are negotiated, as the 
respective states in each zone mediate the contradictions between the 
requirements of capital accumulation and national legitimacy. Colonial 
South Africa, a racist society founded on institutionalized violence, 
could develop the core of its wealth creation through the most ruthless 
and intransigent system, which it has bequeathed to the present-day 
post-colonial, but still greatly unequal, order. Settler America, reinforced 
by slave labour and replenished by successive waves of immigrants, 
required temporary migrants as no more than a regional supplement. 
Western Europe, where the state had a colonial hinterland, could dis-
pense with formal complements to its labour force. But where it lacked 
such a reserve, in Germany or elsewhere, extensive levies of guestwork-
ers would be called on, admitted grudgingly to greater rights only when 
demographic facts on the ground could no longer be ignored. Vice-
versa, the despotisms of the Gulf, sitting on vast oil wealth and fearful 
of regional migration as a threat to their political survival, have resorted 
overwhelmingly to out-of-area guestworkers as the safest way to build 
modern economies and preserve their power by distribution of rents 
to their citizen clienteles. Finally, in the Far East, where the Cold War 
ensured that historical isolates largely remained such, resistance to for-
eign workers of any kind has been much stronger than in Europe. There, 
developmental states have largely continued to rely on local labour 
reserves for the least desirable jobs. 
Looking at the overall history of guestworker programmes, from 
Witwatersrand to the Central Valley, Abu Dhabi to Bavaria, are any gen-
eral evolutionary trends discernible? Two, at least, stand out. Of these, 
the first is the trajectory of their positions within the economies in which 
they have appeared. They begin in agriculture, where the import of tem-
porary supplies of migrant labour is ideal for seasonal rhythms of work, 
and mining, where underground labour makes for closed working envi-
ronments, lending themselves to segregated compounds. Even before 
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the state created guestworker programmes proper, these were the two 
key locations of migrant labour in the Second Reich, and would form 
the basis of the first major schemes in the mines of the Rand and on 
the farms of California and Texas. In a second phase, their centre of 
gravity moved to manufacturing—most prominently in the factories of 
the Wirtschaftswunder in Germany. In a third phase, their leading appli-
cation shifted to services and construction, above all in the Gulf. Thus 
the pattern of their location has tracked the global path of capitalist 
development, in Colin Clark and Jean Fourastié’s terms, from primary 
to secondary to tertiary sectors. Of course, that movement has never 
been uniform. Today micro-guestworker schemes in Europe and North 
America—typically industry-specific quotas bifurcated into high-end 
technologies and low-end services—also include provision for seasonal 
work in agriculture. Nonetheless, a rough general transition up the sec-
toral ladder is apparent.
A second kind of transformation we can trace in these schemes remains 
internal to them all. This is the universal tendency of programmes that 
are designed to use alien workers for a period, and then discard them 
before they can sink roots in national soil, to end by creating what they 
set out to avoid: permanent immigrant communities. For the reasons 
we have seen, guestworker programmes are always subject to leakage 
and overspill, as families arrive, courts mitigate, brokers thrive and 
bureaucrats weaken. That is their basic contradiction, and one that has 
become increasingly difficult to check. Its effects are apparent too in 
what is not a guestworker programme, yet reveals certain commonali-
ties with one. The number of migrant labourers from the countryside in 
China today—some 250 million—is larger than that of all international 
migrants, of whatever kind, put together. These workers cross no for-
eign borders, and are not subject to compulsory return. But the hukou 
system of residential registration, forbidding them legal residence in the 
urban centres where they toil, suggests more than one analogy to guest-
worker schemes. Created by the state, it functions to provide workers to 
enterprises while enforcing a juridical separation between those with 
and those without relevant rights, leaving employers unencumbered 
with permanent employees who might organize and make demands on 
them, and local governments not burdened with extending the social 
benefits to which urban residents are entitled. But like guestworker pro-
grammes, the hukou system is also showing cracks as civil-rights groups 
raise critical voices, and as the ideological difficulties of policing such 
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a division within the body of the citizenry unfold. Thus it too cannot 
prevent illegal yet long-term residence, as labour designed to be limited 
becomes indefinite, and families without permits cluster on the margins 
of big cities. Weber would not be surprised. This would appear to be the 
destiny of every major arrangement for the supply of temporary labour, 
one captured perhaps most succinctly by the French saying that ‘it is 
only the provisional that endures’.
